Voices from the Battle of the Atlantic by Kate Tildesley

	The Atlantic Battles 1939-41.
	This page: the Atlantic Battles 1941-42.
	The Atlantic Battles 1942-45.

Page from autograph book belonging to Paymaster Commander Richard Rankin RNR, in which he recorded the careers, and passing, of many of the Convoy Commodores. Captain Kelly OBE DSO RD RNR was lost with the MV Adda in June 1941. Naval Historical Branch Rankin collection T5513

Phase III: March to December 1941

We have got to lift this business to the highest plane, over everything else⁴¹

They opened fire on us with tracer shell. It was like a New Year's Eve party at two o'clock in the afternoon.⁴²

When the Battle of the Atlantic was raging it was up to each one of us to preserve every ounce of home grown fruit and vegetables we could⁴³

In March 1941 Churchill was 'anxious about the Atlantic'⁴⁴, but, even as he proclaimed the Battle, events at sea, and on land, were changing its nature. The average sailor on an escort might confess that 'most of the time it was very boring, most of the time you were just waiting and watching and not ever letting up on your concentration'⁴⁵, but those in command had learnt from the painful losses of the last eighteen months.

In the absence of a comprehensive manual of anti-submarine warfare, new tactics were improvised and rehearsed by individual escort commanders, and these, together with some luck, brought astonishing successes in the very month that Churchill made his declaration. On 17 March 1941 HM Ships Walker and Vanoc, escorting Convoy HX 112, made contact with a submarine, depth charged her to the surface, and then rammed her. The boat, U 100, sank with the loss of all but six of her crew, her losses included her CO, Joachim Schepke, a debonair and charismatic media darling. By an incredible chance, U 99 surfaced only 1,000 yards from the sinking, just as Vanoc was manoeuvring to pick up the remaining survivors. Volkmar König recalls, 'we hit exactly the spot where the two destroyers were attacking U 100. Just imagine: this big Atlantic, it's like a needle in a haystack'⁴⁶. Walker and Vanoc turned their concentrated fire on U 99, causing her to begin to sink within two minutes⁴⁷. The news of these losses would have been serious enough, but U 47, commanded still by the "Bull of Scapa Flow", Günther Prien, went missing just prior to the sinking of U 99 and U 100, probably the victim of an operational accident⁴⁸.

Convoy conference in Liverpool

If the sinkings failed to boost British confidence, they certainly bruised German morale. The public refused to believe that Prien was gone, conspiracists insisting that he was still alive years after the German defeat⁴⁹, but worse was yet to come. On 9 May 1941 HMS Broadway inflicted 'a further blow not only to the strength of the U-boat branch of the German Navy, but also to the morale of U-boat crews'⁵⁰ when she depth charged U 110 to the surface, rammed her, and caused her crew to abandon ship. Yet another "ace" had been lost in the unfortunate Fritz-Julius Lemp, the man who had begun the war with his sinking of the Athenia, and who is remembered as the man who 'would have liked to have taken his dog to sea with him'⁵¹. Once the survivors had been picked up by HMS Aubretia, David Balme, a young Sub-Lieutenant from HMS Bulldog, led a group of men in a search of the U-boat, still afloat on a sea that was comparatively calm for the Atlantic. Carrying a revolver (and a packet of sandwiches) Balme tentatively entered the boat and began sorting through the masses of documents and equipment left behind by the crew. He recalled in 1959 that 'of course I knew nothing about the use that was later made of what we seized...from my own personal point of view the greatest find was about ten pairs of Super Zeiss binoculars'⁵². In fact the real prize taken from U 110 was the current Enigma settings, which would help the cryptanalysts at that surreally 'distorted fantasy of a venerable English manor house'⁵³, Bletchley Park, to decipher German U-boat signals for most of the rest of the war. Jürgen Rohwer estimates that the ability to read the Enigma codes saved between 1.5 and 2 million tons of shipping during the second half of 1941⁵⁴.

Coastal Command Sunderland, from CB 04050/41(9) Monthly Anti-Submarine Report September 1941

These were not the only successes for Britain and her Allies, however, and many would argue that Ultra was not as decisive an advance as has been assumed since the Ultra secret was revealed in the 1970s. Anti-submarine warfare was becoming both more organized and more sophisticated. Convoy escorts were increased, and the gap in escort coverage, which had formerly existed between Newfoundland and Iceland, was closed. Western Approaches Command was wholly transferred to Liverpool, and, on 17 February 1941, Admiral Sir Percy Noble arrived at Derby House to take up the position of Commander in Chief.

This was also the beginning of the 'intimate and continuous inter-Service co-operation'⁵⁵ with Coastal Command of the RAF, which would create a productive submarine killing force in the years that followed. In the Battle of the Atlantic Coastal Command pioneered the use of Operational Research in their work, and 'by summer 1941 a team of eight scientists and mathematicians, led by the distinguished physicist Professor Patrick Blackett, was delving into every aspect of Coastal Command's operations with the aim of improving efficiency'⁵⁶. Blackett moved to the Admiralty in January 1942 to continue the groundbreaking studies he had begun with the RAF.

In addition to the measures brought in to increase the operational effectiveness of the Allied forces fighting the Battle of the Atlantic, the British Government was succeeding in its own "war" on wastage in the economy. It had been calculated in 1939 that Britain imported 'about 60 million tons of goods per year, but really required only about 47 million tons per year to survive'. By 1941 it was understood that 'Britain could live and fight - just - on about 26 million tons, less than half of prewar imports'⁵⁷. Nutrition had been balanced by patriotism in the minds of most housewives since 1940. By 1941 'deadly statistics were published in women's magazines of how many merchant seamen would perish if each person wasted a crust of bread each day'⁵⁸, and the population was continually reminded that "food is a munition of war". The Government may have made the calculations that Britain could survive on less, but it was down to the people to bear the rigorous enforcing of rationing, and they did so with a patriotic vengeance. It was reported that 'one woman in Northern Ireland typified the patriotic fervour of millions of others when she made 4,897lbs of jam in three months on two primus stoves in the bedroom of her bungalow'⁵⁹. Learning from the mistakes made in the first two years of war, port organization was greatly improved, resulting in 'reductions in port congestion, and a rationalisation of the import and shipping programmes'⁶⁰. Ships in convoy were simply loaded more efficiently. And a combination of the lend-lease agreement reached with the Americans in early 1941, and an increase in shipbuilding production, particularly in Britain and Canada, helped to ease the tonnage crisis. Here, too, women would give their all. After women without children were called up for war service in December 1941 some were given work in the shipyards. Bella Keyzer found welding 'the most exciting and creative work [she] had ever done' and recalled 'out of this place of rough raw men, they built a thing of beauty, a ship, a wonderful thing...the skill, the knowledge, to me it was beautiful'⁶¹. Though the Ministry of Labour might explain that 'the average woman takes to welding as readily as she takes to knitting once she has overcome any initial nervousness due to sparks'⁶², a laughable comment now, the female contribution to the shipbuilding industry was by no means trivial. By 1943 the Ministry of Information was able to report that one of six women employed on the electric welding section of a shipbuilding firm produced 'thirty feet more than a man on similar work'⁶³.

Photograph taken during the attack on a U-boat in the Bay of Biscay by Sunderland U/10 Squadron RAAF, June 1942. Taken from CB 04050/42(6) Monthly Anti-Submarine Report June 1942

British losses at sea continued throughout the third phase of the Battle of the Atlantic, and the war against the U-boats was by no means close to a conclusion. While the Allies improved their anti-submarine tactics, Dönitz enjoyed the fruits of an increase in the number of submarines available for operations. His Rudeltaktik strategy was honed, and the spring of 1941 saw him able to operate several attacking groups in various traffic areas to great effect⁶⁴. The advent of the wolfpack may have changed 'the image of the U-boat commander from a man with a name and a face to a nameless synthesis of many different men'⁶⁵, but Germany was still producing "aces", and the 'convoy lanes were just as dangerous without Prien or Kretschmer hunting in them...the ships continued to sink just as before'⁶⁶. What changed during this period was that Britain began to equip herself for the ultimate victory. The changes were not before time. In December 1941 the tide of the Battle of the Atlantic turned once again.

Phase IV: January to July 1942

What a nuisance Herr Schickelgruber is, but he cant [sic] be feeling very happy about the USA, I should think...⁶⁷.

In the virgin waters of the American theatre we expected success on a scale that would repay the long voyages involved⁶⁸

The amount of debris was just unbelievable. This lumber was just everywhere, and you had to be careful you didn't get any in the propeller. The captain didn't like steaming through it but you had to, to get close enough to the survivors⁶⁹

If France had changed the tenor of the Battle of the Atlantic in June 1940, it changed again with the entry of the United States into the conflict in December 1941. It is now understood that Hitler's declaration of war on America made it impossible for the Axis powers to win, but the initial consequence was carnage for American - and Allied - shipping. Dönitz had been planning a pre-emptive strike in the event of America's entry into the war since September 1941. The result was Operation "Paukenschlag", or "Drumbeat", so called 'because the sudden strike it described would reverberate around the country with the percussive effect of ships exploding'⁷⁰. America was certainly caught unawares. The War Diary of Reinhard Hardegen's U 123 is testimony to her unreadiness. He returned from patrol having sunk a total of nine ships. In stark contrast to British towns, Hardegen states that the towns along the East Coast are bright with lights⁷¹. The initial "strike of the drum" was not isolated. Another three boats were sent to the American coast as the first group of five was returning. Realizing that U-boats could operate successfully at this distance Dönitz also sent boats to operate in the Caribbean and off Newfoundland. Both areas were profitable in terms of sinkings, but the men no doubt preferred the balmy waters of the Caribbean. Erich Topp recalls that off Canada, 'we entered these icy waters and a number of the crew ended up with frozen feet, limbs, we weren't dressed warmly enough. People were standing on the bridges with icicles hanging off their caps; everything was under ice. The water that came on deck froze immediately; the temperature was minus 10 degrees; the balance of the boat was threatened, and every two hours we had to dive to melt away the ice. That was a bad time'⁷².

America was forced swiftly to learn the lessons that Britain had already learned from the Battle of the Atlantic: 'there was considerable '"fat" in the American management system and the cycle of rationalization and regulation tackled by the British in 1941 had begun anew in 1942'⁷³. The Americans seemed initially willing to learn from the British model - 'You people have been at this for two years. You know the business, and we've got to learn and learn fast. I am under your orders'⁷⁴ - but they were also willing to allow the overstretched Royal Canadian Navy to escort most of the convoys around the Eastern seaboard, preferring to carry out offensive A/S sweeps and undertake the independent routeing of shipping 'until they had sufficient escorts'⁷⁵. Since the U-boats continued to wreak havoc on independent shipping along the East Coast of America until the summer of 1942, when they once more returned to pack operations in the mid-Atlantic, the British and Canadians, who had created escorts from anything they could find in 1939 'could only wring their hands and grind their teeth as shipping escorted safely to Halifax was lost to the south'⁷⁶.

American controlled shipping did not suffer the devastation alone. The MV British Splendour was torpedoed by U 552 off Hatteras Buoy on 6 April 1942. Captain Hall's dramatic account described how his 'ship sank so rapidly and the inrush of water was so great that the Assistant Stewards were trapped in their accommodation and never had a chance to escape. The 2nd Cook was apparently washed from his room to the bottom of the exit and owes his life to this fact. The only survivors from the engine room staff was the 3rd Engineer. He was sleeping on his settee and can only remember being blown into the water on the floor of his room...'⁷⁷. The Empire Spring, carrying Commodore Arthur Dibben, was similarly sunk by U 576 on 14 February after the dispersal of Convoy ON 63. His wife Elizabeth later wrote to the Naval Control Service, desperate for news: 'It is now over 6 months since death was presumed, so it so absurd to hope for further news now, but if it is allowed for security reasons, can you tell me anything about what happened?...I dared not ask before, I have no wish now to ask questions I shouldn't, so I shall expect to hear nothing...'⁷⁸.

By June 1942 Allied losses had reached 615,000 GRT of shipping, and Dönitz had unleashed a new wolfpack operation in the Atlantic. Gruppe Hecht, the "pike" group, preyed on Convoys ONS 92, 94, 96, 100, and 102 between 11 May and 21 June. Contact was made with all five convoys, although the operations against ONS 94 and 96 were broken off due to the vagaries of the "other" presence in the Atlantic, the weather. The escorts - a truly Allied mix of British, Canadian, American and Free French - successfully drove the submarines away on several occasions, but the Hecht group still managed to sink 12 ships of 138, a total of 61,464 tons, as well as the Free French corvette Mimose. None of the submarines was damaged. The losses were followed in July 1942 by the disastrous Arctic Convoy, PQ 17. With ever greater numbers of U-boats at his disposal, Dönitz must have seemed close to winning his tonnage war. American entry into the war brought the vast resources of that country into the hands of the Allies, but, while the Americans were still essentially preparing for the Battle of the Atlantic, Germany was dominant throughout Europe, and the U-boat was pre-eminent at sea, 'the prospect...arose of the war becoming so long and the shipping haemorrhage so great that Britain might bleed to death'⁷⁹.

References

41. Winston Churchill to Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, quoted by Williams, op. cit., p114.
42. Helmut Ecke, PK (Propaganda Kompanie) Man on board U 110 at the time of her sinking, Williams, op. cit., p133.
43. Marguerite Patten, We'll Eat Again: A collection of recipes from the war years selected by Marguerite Patten, in association with the Imperial War Museum, London, Hamlyn, 1985.
44. 'I'm not afraid of the Air, I'm not afraid of invasion, I'm less afraid of the Balkans - but - I'm anxious about the Atlantic', Churchill's comments to the War Cabinet, 20 March 1941, Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill. Volume VI. Finest Hour 1939-1941, London, Heinemann, 1983, p1040.
45. John Arthur, HMS Anemone, Howard-Bailey, op. cit., p7.
46. Volkmar König, Midshipman, U 99, Williams, op. cit., p123.
47. 3 men were killed in the attack, but 40 survived, including Otto Kretschmer himself, to be taken into captivity. Kretschmer survived the war in prison camps in the UK and Canada, proving himself to be as controversial a prisoner as he had been an effective captain. See Vause, op. cit., p215-216.
48. It was assumed for many years that U 47 had been sunk by HMS Wolverine. The sinking was re-assessed by the Foreign Documents Section of the Naval Historical Branch in June 1991, when it was proved that Wolverine's attacks had been unsuccessfully carried out on U A. The cause for U 47's sinking was given as "unknown". U A was under construction in Germany as the Turkish submarine Batiray when war broke out, and was subsequently commissioned as a German submarine. She was given the name "U A" to distinguish her from the other U-boats in commission.
49. Vause, op. cit., p90.
50. U 110 Interrogation of Survivors CB 4051(23), Public Record Office ADM 186/806.
51. Monthly Anti-Submarine Report for June 1941, CB 04050/41(6), Anti-Submarine Warfare Division of the Naval Staff, p34. In the absence of his dog Lemp had the device of a terrier puppy painted on the conning tower of both U 30 and U 110.
52. Captain S W Roskill DSC RN (Retd.), The Secret Capture, London, Collins, 1959, p119.
53. Stephen Budiansky, Battle of Wits: The Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II, London, Penguin, 2001, p119-120.
54. See Jürgen Rohwer, 'The Wireless War', Howarth and Law, op. cit. p411. Other writers have suggested that Rohwer's calculations may be exaggerated. See also W J R Gardner, Decoding History: The Battle of the Atlantic and Ultra, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999.
55. John Terraine, The U-boat Wars, quoted by Henry Probert, 'Allied Land-Based Anti-Submarine Warfare', Howarth and Law, op. cit., p373.
56. Williams, op. cit., p201.
57. Marc Milner, 'The Battle of the Atlantic', Journal of Strategic Studies, 13, 1990, p48.
58. Minns, op. cit., p91.
59. Minns, op. cit., p98-99.
60. Milner, op. cit., p48.
61. Angela Holdsworth, Out of the Dolls House: The Story of Women in the Twentieth Century, London, BBC Books, 1988, p75-76.
62. Holdsworth, op. cit., p75-76.
63. Minns, op. cit., p34. Men working in shipyards earned three times more than the women (see Holdsworth, p75), but as the woman quoted was employed on piecework, her achievements earned her £9 18s in one week.
64. Jan G. Heitmann, 'The Front Line: Convoy HG 76 - The Offence', Howarth and Law, op. cit., p490.
65. Vause, op. cit., p71.
66. Vause, op. cit., p93.
67. Letter from Admiral Richard Hill to Richard Rankin, January 1942, Naval Historical Branch collections T5715
68. Karl Dönitz, Memoirs, translated by R H Stevens, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959, p197.
69. James Keachie, Sub-Lieutenant, HMS Bluebell, Williams, op. cit., p91.
70. Vause, op. cit., p127.
71. '17. Januar Voraus in Richtung Cap Henlopen. Städte an der Küste hell erleuchtet'. Kriegstagebuch, U 123, Admiralty reference PG 30113, Naval Historical Branch collections.
72. Williams, op. cit., p169-170.
73. Milner, op. cit., p52.
74. Comment made by the Captain of American destroyer to Lieutenant Colin Warwick RNR, Williams, op. cit., p184. Warwick had told the Captain that, as the senior officer, he ought to command the escorts of the first convoy from New York to Norfolk, Virginia. The British Naval Liaison Officer backed the American's decision.
75. Milner, op. cit., p52.
76. Milner, op. cit., p53.
77. Report of an interview with the Master, Captain J Hall, of the MV British Splendour, 5^th June 1942, Public Record Office ADM 199/2140.
78. Letter from Elizabeth Dibben to Richard Rankin dated 13 September 1942, Naval Historical Branch collections T5667. The fate of Commodore Dibben was not realized until captured German documents fell into Allied hands at the close of the war.
79. Philip Pugh, 'Military Need and Civil Necessity', Howarth and Law, op. cit., p39.

Article by Kate Tildesley

	The Atlantic Battles 1939-41.
	This page: the Atlantic Battles 1941-42.
	The Atlantic Battles 1942-45.